During registration, one may be required to give their email address, to
be verified and activated later. However, if one makes a mistake, a
typo, they may end up with an account that cannot be activated due to
having a wrong email address.
They can still log in, but not change the email address, thus, no way to
activate it without help from an administrator.
To remedy this issue, lets allow changing the email address for logged
in, but not activated users.
This fixes gitea#17785.
Signed-off-by: Gergely Nagy <forgejo@gergo.csillger.hu>
(cherry picked from commit aaaece28e4)
(cherry picked from commit 639dafabec)
(cherry picked from commit d699c12ceb)
[GITEA] Allow changing the email address before activation (squash) cache is always active
This needs to be revisited because the MailResendLimit is not enforced
and turns out to not be tested.
See e7cb8da2a8 * Always enable caches (#28527)
(cherry picked from commit 43ded8ee30)
Rate limit pre-activation email change separately
Changing the email address before any email address is activated should
be subject to a different rate limit than the normal activation email
resending. If there's only one rate limit for both, then if a newly
signed up quickly discovers they gave a wrong email address, they'd have
to wait three minutes to change it.
With the two separate limits, they don't - but they'll have to wait
three minutes before they can change the email address again.
The downside of this setup is that a malicious actor can alternate
between resending and changing the email address (to something like
`user+$idx@domain`, delivered to the same inbox) to effectively halving
the rate limit. I do not think there's a better solution, and this feels
like such a small attack surface that I'd deem it acceptable.
The way the code works after this change is that `ActivatePost` will now
check the `MailChangeLimit_user` key rather than `MailResendLimit_user`,
and if we're within the limit, it will set `MailChangedJustNow_user`. The
`Activate` method - which sends the activation email, whether it is a
normal resend, or one following an email change - will check
`MailChangedJustNow_user`, and if it is set, it will check the rate
limit against `MailChangedLimit_user`, otherwise against
`MailResendLimit_user`, and then will delete the
`MailChangedJustNow_user` key from the cache.
Fixes#2040.
Signed-off-by: Gergely Nagy <forgejo@gergo.csillger.hu>
(cherry picked from commit e35d2af2e5)
(cherry picked from commit 03989418a7)
(cherry picked from commit f50e0dfe5e)
(cherry picked from commit cad9184a36)
(cherry picked from commit e2da5d7fe1)
(cherry picked from commit 3a80534d4d)
Sends email with information on the new user (time of creation and time of last sign-in) and a link to manage the new user from the admin panel
closes: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/480
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/1371
Co-authored-by: Aravinth Manivannan <realaravinth@batsense.net>
Co-committed-by: Aravinth Manivannan <realaravinth@batsense.net>
(cherry picked from commit c721aa828b)
(cherry picked from commit 6487efcb9d)
Conflicts:
modules/notification/base/notifier.go
modules/notification/base/null.go
modules/notification/notification.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/1422
(cherry picked from commit 7ea66ee1c5)
Conflicts:
services/notify/notifier.go
services/notify/notify.go
services/notify/null.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/1469
(cherry picked from commit 7d2d997011)
(cherry picked from commit 435a54f140)
(cherry picked from commit 8ec7b3e448)
[GITEA] notifies admins on new user registration (squash) performance bottleneck
Refs: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/1479
(cherry picked from commit 97ac9147ff)
(cherry picked from commit 19f295c16b)
(cherry picked from commit 3367dcb2cf)
[GITEA] notifies admins on new user registration (squash) cosmetic changes
Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
(cherry picked from commit 9f1670e040)
(cherry picked from commit de5bb2a224)
(cherry picked from commit 8f8e52f31a)
(cherry picked from commit e0d5130312)
(cherry picked from commit f1288d6d9b)
(cherry picked from commit 1db4736fd7)
(cherry picked from commit e8dcbb6cd6)
(cherry picked from commit 09625d6476)
[GITEA] notifies admins on new user registration (squash) ctx.Locale
(cherry picked from commit dab7212fad)
(cherry picked from commit 9b7bbae8c4)
(cherry picked from commit f750b71d3d)
(cherry picked from commit f79af36679)
(cherry picked from commit e76eee334e)
[GITEA] notifies admins on new user registration (squash) fix locale
(cherry picked from commit 54cd100d8d)
(cherry picked from commit 053dbd3d50)
[GITEA] notifies admins on new user registration (squash) fix URL
1. Use absolute URL in the admin panel link sent on new registrations
2. Include absolute URL of the newly signed-up user's profile.
New email looks like this:
<details><summary>Please click to expand</summary>
```
--153937b1864f158f4fd145c4b5d4a513568681dd489021dd466a8ad7b770
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
User Information: @realaravinth ( http://localhost:3000/realaravinth )
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* Created: 2023-12-13 19:36:50 +05:30
Please click here ( http://localhost:3000/admin/users/9 ) to manage the use=
r from the admin panel.
--153937b1864f158f4fd145c4b5d4a513568681dd489021dd466a8ad7b770
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8">
<title>New user realaravinth just signed up</title>
<style>
blockquote { padding-left: 1em; margin: 1em 0; border-left: 1px solid gre=
y; color: #777}
.footer { font-size:small; color:#666;}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<ul>
<h3>User Information: <a href=3D"http://localhost:3000/realaravinth">@rea=
laravinth</a></h3>
<li>Created: <relative-time format=3D"datetime" weekday=3D"" year=3D"nume=
ric" month=3D"short" day=3D"numeric" hour=3D"numeric" minute=3D"numeric" se=
cond=3D"numeric" datetime=3D"2023-12-13T19:36:50+05:30">2023-12-13 19:36:50=
+05:30</relative-time></li>
</ul>
<p> Please <a href=3D"http://localhost:3000/admin/users/9" rel=3D"nofollow=
">click here</a> to manage the user from the admin panel. </p>
</body>
</html>
--153937b1864f158f4fd145c4b5d4a513568681dd489021dd466a8ad7b770--
```
</details>
fixes: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/1927
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/1940
Reviewed-by: Earl Warren <earl-warren@noreply.codeberg.org>
Reviewed-by: Gusted <gusted@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Aravinth Manivannan <realaravinth@batsense.net>
Co-committed-by: Aravinth Manivannan <realaravinth@batsense.net>
(cherry picked from commit b8d764e36a)
(cherry picked from commit d48b84f623)
Conflicts:
routers/web/auth/auth.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2034
(cherry picked from commit 02d3c125cc)
(cherry picked from commit 367374ecc3)
Conflicts:
models/user/user_test.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2119
(cherry picked from commit 4124fa5aa4)
(cherry picked from commit 7f12610ff6)
[GITEA] notifies admins on new user registration (squash) DeleteByID
trivial conflict because of
778ad795fd Refactor deletion (#28610)
(cherry picked from commit 05682614e5)
(cherry picked from commit 64bd374803)
(cherry picked from commit 63d086f666)
(cherry picked from commit 3cd48ef4d5)
Conflicts:
options/locale/locale_en-US.ini
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2249
(cherry picked from commit 6578ec4ed6)
Conflicts:
routers/web/auth/auth.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2300
- This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and
v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA
mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo
Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been
left out.
- The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can
construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in
the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is
dumped/leaked.
- This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies).
- Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works.
- Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore.
(cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63)
(cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5)
(cherry picked from commit b0c5165145)
(cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d)
(cherry picked from commit 64f053f383)
(cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c20)
Conflicts:
services/auth/auth_token_test.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069
(cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4b)
(cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab0)
(cherry picked from commit 9220088f90)
(cherry picked from commit c73ac63696)
(cherry picked from commit 747a176048)
Conflicts:
models/user/user.go
routers/web/user/setting/account.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2295
Fixes#28660
Fixes an admin api bug related to `user.LoginSource`
Fixed `/user/emails` response not identical to GitHub api
This PR unifies the user update methods. The goal is to keep the logic
only at one place (having audit logs in mind). For example, do the
password checks only in one method not everywhere a password is updated.
After that PR is merged, the user creation should be next.
Nowadays, cache will be used on almost everywhere of Gitea and it cannot
be disabled, otherwise some features will become unaviable.
Then I think we can just remove the option for cache enable. That means
cache cannot be disabled.
But of course, we can still use cache configuration to set how should
Gitea use the cache.
The steps to reproduce it.
First, create a new oauth2 source.
Then, a user login with this oauth2 source.
Disable the oauth2 source.
Visit users -> settings -> security, 500 will be displayed.
This is because this page only load active Oauth2 sources but not all
Oauth2 sources.
Closes#27455
> The mechanism responsible for long-term authentication (the 'remember
me' cookie) uses a weak construction technique. It will hash the user's
hashed password and the rands value; it will then call the secure cookie
code, which will encrypt the user's name with the computed hash. If one
were able to dump the database, they could extract those two values to
rebuild that cookie and impersonate a user. That vulnerability exists
from the date the dump was obtained until a user changed their password.
>
> To fix this security issue, the cookie could be created and verified
using a different technique such as the one explained at
https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies.
The PR removes the now obsolete setting `COOKIE_USERNAME`.
This PR removed `unittest.MainTest` the second parameter
`TestOptions.GiteaRoot`. Now it detects the root directory by current
working directory.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Part of #27065
This reduces the usage of `db.DefaultContext`. I think I've got enough
files for the first PR. When this is merged, I will continue working on
this.
Considering how many files this PR affect, I hope it won't take to long
to merge, so I don't end up in the merge conflict hell.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
## Changes
- Forces flashed error to render immediately when forgot password code
is incorrect or has expired.
- Adds a link back to the `forgot_password` page so that the user can
restart the process (in the event that their link has expired)
Before:
* `{{.locale.Tr ...}}`
* `{{$.locale.Tr ...}}`
* `{{$.root.locale.Tr ...}}`
* `{{template "sub" .}}`
* `{{template "sub" (dict "locale" $.locale)}}`
* `{{template "sub" (dict "root" $)}}`
* .....
With context function: only need to `{{ctx.Locale.Tr ...}}`
The "ctx" could be considered as a super-global variable for all
templates including sub-templates.
To avoid potential risks (any bug in the template context function
package), this PR only starts using "ctx" in "head.tmpl" and
"footer.tmpl" and it has a "DataRaceCheck". If there is anything wrong,
the code can be fixed or reverted easily.
The JSONRedirect/JSONOK/JSONError functions were put into "Base" context
incorrectly, it would cause abuse.
Actually, they are for "web context" only, so, move them to the correct
place.
And by the way, use them to simplify old code: +75 -196
Bumping `github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` from v4 to v5.
`github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` v5 is bringing some breaking changes:
- standard `Valid()` method on claims is removed. It's replaced by
`ClaimsValidator` interface implementing `Validator()` method instead,
which is called after standard validation. Gitea doesn't seem to be
using this logic.
- `jwt.Token` has a field `Valid`, so it's checked in `ParseToken`
function in `services/auth/source/oauth2/token.go`
---------
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
The PKCE flow according to [RFC
7636](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636) allows for secure
authorization without the requirement to provide a client secret for the
OAuth app.
It is implemented in Gitea since #5378 (v1.8.0), however without being
able to omit client secret.
Since #21316 Gitea supports setting client type at OAuth app
registration.
As public clients are already forced to use PKCE since #21316, in this
PR the client secret check is being skipped if a public client is
detected. As Gitea seems to implement PKCE authorization correctly
according to the spec, this would allow for PKCE flow without providing
a client secret.
Also add some docs for it, please check language as I'm not a native
English speaker.
Closes#17107Closes#25047
The "modules/context.go" is too large to maintain.
This PR splits it to separate files, eg: context_request.go,
context_response.go, context_serve.go
This PR will help:
1. The future refactoring for Gitea's web context (eg: simplify the context)
2. Introduce proper "range request" support
3. Introduce context function
This PR only moves code, doesn't change any logic.
This change prevents Gitea from bypassing the manual approval process
for newly registered users when OIDC is used.
- Resolves https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/23392
Signed-off-by: Gary Moon <gary@garymoon.net>
Close#24062
At the beginning, I just wanted to fix the warning mentioned by #24062
But, the cookie code really doesn't look good to me, so clean up them.
Complete the TODO on `SetCookie`:
> TODO: Copied from gitea.com/macaron/macaron and should be improved
after macaron removed.
This PR refactors and improves the password hashing code within gitea
and makes it possible for server administrators to set the password
hashing parameters
In addition it takes the opportunity to adjust the settings for `pbkdf2`
in order to make the hashing a little stronger.
The majority of this work was inspired by PR #14751 and I would like to
thank @boppy for their work on this.
Thanks to @gusted for the suggestion to adjust the `pbkdf2` hashing
parameters.
Close#14751
---------
Signed-off-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net>
Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
Co-authored-by: John Olheiser <john.olheiser@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
To avoid duplicated load of the same data in an HTTP request, we can set
a context cache to do that. i.e. Some pages may load a user from a
database with the same id in different areas on the same page. But the
code is hidden in two different deep logic. How should we share the
user? As a result of this PR, now if both entry functions accept
`context.Context` as the first parameter and we just need to refactor
`GetUserByID` to reuse the user from the context cache. Then it will not
be loaded twice on an HTTP request.
But of course, sometimes we would like to reload an object from the
database, that's why `RemoveContextData` is also exposed.
The core context cache is here. It defines a new context
```go
type cacheContext struct {
ctx context.Context
data map[any]map[any]any
lock sync.RWMutex
}
var cacheContextKey = struct{}{}
func WithCacheContext(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, cacheContextKey, &cacheContext{
ctx: ctx,
data: make(map[any]map[any]any),
})
}
```
Then you can use the below 4 methods to read/write/del the data within
the same context.
```go
func GetContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key any) any
func SetContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key, value any)
func RemoveContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key any)
func GetWithContextCache[T any](ctx context.Context, cacheGroupKey string, cacheTargetID any, f func() (T, error)) (T, error)
```
Then let's take a look at how `system.GetString` implement it.
```go
func GetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string) (string, error) {
return cache.GetWithContextCache(ctx, contextCacheKey, key, func() (string, error) {
return cache.GetString(genSettingCacheKey(key), func() (string, error) {
res, err := GetSettingNoCache(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return res.SettingValue, nil
})
})
}
```
First, it will check if context data include the setting object with the
key. If not, it will query from the global cache which may be memory or
a Redis cache. If not, it will get the object from the database. In the
end, if the object gets from the global cache or database, it will be
set into the context cache.
An object stored in the context cache will only be destroyed after the
context disappeared.
Fixes#19555
Test-Instructions:
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/21441#issuecomment-1419438000
This PR implements the mapping of user groups provided by OIDC providers
to orgs teams in Gitea. The main part is a refactoring of the existing
LDAP code to make it usable from different providers.
Refactorings:
- Moved the router auth code from module to service because of import
cycles
- Changed some model methods to take a `Context` parameter
- Moved the mapping code from LDAP to a common location
I've tested it with Keycloak but other providers should work too. The
JSON mapping format is the same as for LDAP.
---------
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
On activating local accounts, the error message didn't differentiate
between using a wrong or expired token, or a wrong password. The result
could already be obtained from the behaviour (different screens were
presented), but the error message was misleading and lead to confusion
for new users on Codeberg with Forgejo.
Now, entering a wrong password for a valid token prints a different
error message.
The problem was introduced in 0f14f69e60.
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
The regular login flow can use a `redirect_to` cookie to ensure the user
ends their authentication flow on the same page as where they started
it.
This commit adds the same functionality to the OAuth login URLs, so that
you can use URLs like these to directly use a specific OAuth provider:
`/user/oauth2/{provider}?redirect_to={post-login path}`
Only the `auth.SignInOAuth()` function needed a change for this, as the
rest of the login flow is aware of this cookie and uses it properly
already.
Change all license headers to comply with REUSE specification.
Fix#16132
Co-authored-by: flynnnnnnnnnn <flynnnnnnnnnn@github>
Co-authored-by: John Olheiser <john.olheiser@gmail.com>
Enable this to require captcha validation for user login. You also must
enable `ENABLE_CAPTCHA`.
Summary:
- Consolidate CAPTCHA template
- add CAPTCHA handle and context
- add `REQUIRE_CAPTCHA_FOR_LOGIN` config and docs
- Consolidate CAPTCHA set-up and verification code
Partially resolved#6049
Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zhou <i@sourcehut.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net>
The OAuth spec [defines two types of
client](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-2.1),
confidential and public. Previously Gitea assumed all clients to be
confidential.
> OAuth defines two client types, based on their ability to authenticate
securely with the authorization server (i.e., ability to
> maintain the confidentiality of their client credentials):
>
> confidential
> Clients capable of maintaining the confidentiality of their
credentials (e.g., client implemented on a secure server with
> restricted access to the client credentials), or capable of secure
client authentication using other means.
>
> **public
> Clients incapable of maintaining the confidentiality of their
credentials (e.g., clients executing on the device used by the resource
owner, such as an installed native application or a web browser-based
application), and incapable of secure client authentication via any
other means.**
>
> The client type designation is based on the authorization server's
definition of secure authentication and its acceptable exposure levels
of client credentials. The authorization server SHOULD NOT make
assumptions about the client type.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8252#section-8.4
> Authorization servers MUST record the client type in the client
registration details in order to identify and process requests
accordingly.
Require PKCE for public clients:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8252#section-8.1
> Authorization servers SHOULD reject authorization requests from native
apps that don't use PKCE by returning an error message
Fixes#21299
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
According to the OAuth spec
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-6 when "Refreshing
an Access Token"
> The authorization server MUST ... require client authentication for
confidential clients
Fixes#21418
Co-authored-by: Gusted <williamzijl7@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
