Since we now remember the final location redirects lead to
and use it for all further checks since
3e134b07fa, these redirects
can no longer be exploited to serve counterfeit objects.
This fixes:
- display URLs from independent webapp clients
redirecting to the canonical domain
- Peertube display URLs for remote content
(acting like the above)
As hinted at in the commit message when strict checking
was added in 8684964c5d,
refetching is more robust than display URL comparison
but in exchange is harder to implement correctly.
A similar refetch approach is also employed by
e.g. Mastodon, IceShrimp and FireFish.
To make sure no checks can be bypassed by forcing
a refetch, id checking is placed at the very end.
This will fix:
- Peertube display URL arrays our transmogrifier fails to normalise
- non-canonical display URLs from alternative frontends
(theoretical; we didnt’t get any actual reports about this)
It will also be helpful in the planned key handling overhaul.
The modified user collision test was introduced in
https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma/-/merge_requests/461
and unfortunately the issues this fixes aren’t public.
Afaict it was just meant to guard against someone serving
faked data belonging to an unrelated domain. Since we now
refetch and the id actually is mocked, lookup now succeeds
but will use the real data from the authorative server
making it unproblematic. Instead modify the fake data further
and make sure we don’t end up using the spoofed version.
Usually an id should point to another AP object
and the image file isn’t an AP object. We currently
do not provide standalone AP objects for emoji and
don't keep track of remote emoji at all.
Thus just federate them as anonymous objects,
i.e. objects only existing within a parent context
and using an explicit null id.
IceShrimp.NET previously adopted anonymous objects
for remote emoji without any apparent issues. See:
333611f65e
Fixes: https://akkoma.dev/AkkomaGang/akkoma/issues/694
We’ve received reports of some specific instances slowly accumulating
more and more binary data over time up to OOMs and globally setting
ERL_FULLSWEEP_AFTER=0 has proven to be an effective countermeasure.
However, this incurs increased cpu perf costs everywhere and is
thus not suitable to apply out of the box.
Apparently long-lived Phoenix websocket processes are known to
often cause exactly this by getting into a state unfavourable
for the garbage collector.
Therefore it seems likely affected instances are using timeline
streaming and do so in just the right way to trigger this. We
can tune the garbage collector just for websocket processes
and use a more lenient value of 20 to keep the added perf cost
in check.
Testing on one affected instance appears to confirm this theory
Ref.:
https://www.erlang.org/doc/man/erlang#ghlink-process_flag-2-idp226https://blog.guzman.codes/using-phoenix-channels-high-memory-usage-save-money-with-erlfullsweepafterhttps://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma/-/merge_requests/4060
Tested-by: bjo
Ever since 364b6969eb
this setting wasn't used by the backend and a noop.
The stated usecase is better served by setting the base_url
to a local subdomain and using proxying in nginx/Caddy/...
Websites are increasingly getting more bloated with tricks like inlining content (e.g., CNN.com) which puts pages at or above 5MB. This value may still be too low.
Rich Media parsing was previously handled on-demand with a 2 second HTTP request timeout and retained only in Cachex. Every time a Pleroma instance is restarted it will have to request and parse the data for each status with a URL detected. When fetching a batch of statuses they were processed in parallel to attempt to keep the maximum latency at 2 seconds, but often resulted in a timeline appearing to hang during loading due to a URL that could not be successfully reached. URLs which had images links that expire (Amazon AWS) were parsed and inserted with a TTL to ensure the image link would not break.
Rich Media data is now cached in the database and fetched asynchronously. Cachex is used as a read-through cache. When the data becomes available we stream an update to the clients. If the result is returned quickly the experience is almost seamless. Activities were already processed for their Rich Media data during ingestion to warm the cache, so users should not normally encounter the asynchronous loading of the Rich Media data.
Implementation notes:
- The async worker is a Task with a globally unique process name to prevent duplicate processing of the same URL
- The Task will attempt to fetch the data 3 times with increasing sleep time between attempts
- The HTTP request obeys the default HTTP request timeout value instead of 2 seconds
- URLs that cannot be successfully parsed due to an unexpected error receives a negative cache entry for 15 minutes
- URLs that fail with an expected error will receive a negative cache with no TTL
- Activities that have no detected URLs insert a nil value in the Cachex :scrubber_cache so we do not repeat parsing the object content with Floki every time the activity is rendered
- Expiring image URLs are handled with an Oban job
- There is no automatic cleanup of the Rich Media data in the database, but it is safe to delete at any time
- The post draft/preview feature makes the URL processing synchronous so the rendered post preview will have an accurate rendering
Overall performance of timelines and creating new posts which contain URLs is greatly improved.
This lets us:
- avoid issues with broken hash indices for PostgreSQL <10
- drop runtime checks and legacy codepaths for <11 in db search
- always enable custom query plans for performance optimisation
PostgreSQL 11 is already EOL since 2023-11-09, so
in theory everyone should already have moved on to 12 anyway.
