Commit graph

4 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Oneric 8684964c5d Only allow exact id matches
This protects us from falling for obvious spoofs as from the current
upload exploit (unfortunately we can’t reasonably do anything about
spoofs with exact matches as was possible via emoji and proxy).

Such objects being invalid is supported by the spec, sepcifically
sections 3.1 and 3.2: https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#obj-id

Anonymous objects are not relevant here (they can only exists within
parent objects iiuc) and neither is client-to-server or transient objects
(as those cannot be fetched in the first place).
This leaves us with the requirement for `id` to (a) exist and
(b) be a publicly dereferencable URI from the originating server.
This alone does not yet demand strict equivalence, but the spec then
further explains objects ought to be fetchable _via their ID_.
Meaning an object not retrievable via its ID, is invalid.

This reading is supported by the fact, e.g. GoToSocial (recently) and
Mastodon (for 6+ years) do already implement such strict ID checks,
additionally proving this doesn’t cause federation issues in practice.

However, apart from canonical IDs there can also be additional display
URLs. *omas first redirect those to their canonical location, but *keys
and Mastodon directly serve the AP representation without redirects.

Mastodon and GTS deal with this in two different ways,
but both constitute an effective countermeasure:
 - Mastodon:
   Unless it already is a known AP id, two fetches occur.
   The first fetch just reads the `id` property and then refetches from
   the id. The last fetch requires the returned id to exactly match the
   URL the content was fetched from. (This can be optimised by skipping
   the second fetch if it already matches)
   05eda8d193/app/helpers/jsonld_helper.rb (L168)
   63f0979799

 - GTS:
   Only does a single fetch and then checks if _either_ the id
   _or_ url property (which can be an object) match the original fetch
   URL. This relies on implementations always including their display URL
   as "url" if differing from the id. For actors this is true for all
   investigated implementations, for posts only Mastodon includes an
   "url", but it is also the only one with a differing display URL.
   2bafd7daf5 (diff-943bbb02c8ac74ac5dc5d20807e561dcdfaebdc3b62b10730f643a20ac23c24fR222)

Albeit Mastodon’s refetch offers higher compatibility with theoretical
implmentations using either multiple different display URL or not
denoting any of them as "url" at all, for now we chose to adopt a
GTS-like refetch-free approach to avoid additional implementation
concerns wrt to whether redirects should be allowed when fetching a
canonical AP id and potential for accidentally loosening some checks
(e.g. cross-domain refetches) for one of the fetches.
This may be reconsidered in the future.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
Oneric fee57eb376 Move actor check into fetch_and_contain_remote_object_from_id
This brings it in line with its name and closes an,
in practice harmless, verification hole.

This was/is the only user of contain_origin making it
safe to change the behaviour on actor-less objects.

Until now refetched objects did not ensure the new actor matches the
domain of the object. We refetch polls occasionally to retrieve
up-to-date vote counts. A malicious AP server could have switched out
the poll after initial posting with a completely different post
attribute to an actor from another server.
While we indeed fell for this spoof before the commit,
it fortunately seems to have had no ill effect in practice,
since the asociated Create activity is not changed. When exposing the
actor via our REST API, we read this info from the activity not the
object.

This at first thought still keeps one avenue for exploit open though:
the updated actor can be from our own domain and a third server be
instructed to fetch the object from us. However this is foiled by an
id mismatch. By necessity of being fetchable and our longstanding
same-domain check, the id must still be from the attacker’s server.
Even the most barebone authenticity check is able to sus this out.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
Haelwenn (lanodan) Monnier c4439c630f
Bump Copyright to 2021
grep -rl '# Copyright © .* Pleroma' * | xargs sed -i 's;Copyright © .* Pleroma .*;Copyright © 2017-2021 Pleroma Authors <https://pleroma.social/>;'
2021-01-13 07:49:50 +01:00
Alexander Strizhakov 7dffaef479
tests consistency 2020-10-13 16:35:09 +03:00
Renamed from test/object/containment_test.exs (Browse further)